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I. INTRODUCTION

Immigrants are a daily part of American life. They work in every sector
of the economy and form strong social and familial bonds in the
community. The legislative and cultural history of the United States has
encouraged immigration as a constant source of vibrancy, dynamism, and
renewal. One of the main mechanisms for becoming a United States
citizen is through the process of adjusting status based on a strong relation
to this country such as family or employment. Although Congress has set
relatively broad criteria as to eligibility to adjust status,' the Attorney
General has severely restricted this avenue through questionable
regulation.
Title 8, § 245.1 of the Code of Federal Regulations governs adjustment
of status for aliens 2 who wish to seek permanent residence in the United
States.3 The regulation, which is promulgated by the Attorney General, is
a derivative of the power granted to him by Congress pursuant to § 245(a)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).4 This section of the INA
grants the Attorney General the discretion to adjust status of a prescribed
set of aliens to that of a "Lawful Permanent Resident" (LPR) when certain
conditions are met.5 The statute also contemplates that the Attorney
General may issue regulations to guide the process of adjustment.6
Pursuant to this statute, the Attorney General has created a lengthy set
of regulations dealing with the adjustment process.7 The regulation
codified at 8 C.F.R. § 245.1 creates a laundry list of specifics under the
caption of "eligibility." 8 One subsection within this regulation in particular
has created a nascent and growing controversy in immigration law.
Specifically, 8 § 245.1(c)(8) provides that any alien who is classed as
an "arriving alien" and who is currently in removal proceedings is declared

1. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255(a) (West 2006).
2. The term "alien" will be used in this Note for the sake of continuity with statutes and
case-law. It is noted, however, that this term has been criticized as being a stigmatizing linguistic
force, which has served to reinforce the self/other divide between natives and immigrants in the
United States. See, e.g., KEvIN R. JOHNSON, THE "HUDDLED MASSES" MYTH 152-56 (2004)
(examining the detrimental effects of such terminology). For the record, this Note makes no
judgment about the propriety of such terminology.
3. 8 C.F.R. § 245.1 (2005). This regulation is virtually identical to 8 C.F.R. § 1245.1, and
different courts often use these numbers interchangeably.
4. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 245(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255(a) (West 2006).
When referring to this statute, this Note will use United States Code designations.
5. Id. The section reads: "The status of an alien who was inspected and admitted or paroled
into the United States ...may be adjusted by the Attorney General, in his discretion and under such
regulations as he may prescribe ..."Id.
6. Id.
7. 8 C.F.R. §§ 245-247 (2005).
8. See 8 C.F.R. § 245.1.
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per se ineligible to adjust status.9 The controversy over this provision
stems from the apparent conflict between the Attorney General's almost
categorical exclusion of paroled aliens-a subset of arriving aliens-from
relief, and the underlying enabling statute, which specifically mentions
"paroled" aliens as a class eligible for discretionary relief.'" Since, almost
by definition, aliens who are paroled into the United States are placed into
removal proceedings," the Attorney General has essentially excised by
regulation an entire class of aliens who otherwise might be afforded relief
from removal as specified by Congress.
The Attorney General has defended the integrity of the regulation by
principally relying on Congress's explicit commitment of the matter to his
discretion. 12 This defense has taken on two forms. First, this argument took
the form of a contention that Article LI courts lacked the proper
jurisdiction to invalidate the regulation 3 because matters committed solely
to the discretion of the Attorney General by Congress in various areas of
alien removal are beyond review. 4 As a second derivative argument, the
Attorney General has contended that, even if the courts had the jurisdiction
a valid exercise
to review the regulation, the regulation itself represented
15
granted.
expressly
was
which
discretion
of the
In the 2005 case of Succarv. Ashcroft,16 however, the Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit rejected both of the Attorney General's arguments and
invalidated the regulation. 7 The main focus of the court's reasoning in that
case was that the regulation was an impermissible alteration of the
eligibility requirements for adjustment of status-a power Congress had

9. Id. § 245.1(c)(8). "Any arriving alien who is in removal proceedings pursuant to section
235(b)(1) or section 240 of the Act [is ineligible to adjust]." Id.
10. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255(a) (West 2006). "The status of an alien who was inspected and
Id.
I... (emphasis added). The
admitted or paroled into the United States... may be adjusted .
concept of parole is critical in immigration law. It is a mechanism whereby aliens can be discharged
into the United States at the discretion of an immigration officer upon physical entry, pending
further review of admissibility at a later date. For further detailed discussion of parole, see infra
Part II.C.
11. There are not immediately accessible statistics on this matter, but this is a logical result
based on the statutes governing inspection and admissibility. If an officer inspects an "applicant for
admission," and does not find him to be "clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted," then
the officer shall place the alien into removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1225(b)(2)(A). For further
discussion, see infra Part lI.C and notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
12. See Succar v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 8, 19 (1st Cir. 2005).
13. See id.
14. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(I) (West 2006) (specifically forbidding judicial review
of the discretionary denial of adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255); see generally 8
U.S.C.A. § 1252 (outlining principles of judicial review of orders of removal).
15. See Succar, 394 F.3d at 21.
16. 394 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2005).
17. Id. at 36.
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exclusively reserved unto itself.18 This case marked the beginning in a
series of rapid decisions that have split the circuits on the question of the
continued validity of § 245.1(c)(8). 9
When then Attorney General Janet Reno implemented the regulation
in 1997, she justified it by stating that it was necessary in order to be
consistent with Congress's intent in passing the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), 20 which
sought to expedite the removal of arriving aliens. 2' The soundness of this
rationale, however, has been called sharply into question by the Succar
case. 22 Specifically, that court noted that although Congress had amended
the adjustment of status provisions in the INA several times since its
original passage, including in the IIRIRA, it had not altered the eligibility
of paroled aliens to adjust. 23 In addition, the court added that the new
regulation indeed had the effect of counteracting many of the
congressional fixes that had been instituted over the years to streamline the
adjustment system.24
Denying paroled aliens the ability to lawfully adjust status because of
a suspect regulation works mischief not only with congressional intent, but
also with public policy, and even notions of fundamental fairness. The
system of removal of aliens in the United States is a cumbersome process.
Aliens often find themselves in administrative and legal adjudication for
years on end.25 In the meantime, however, these aliens continue to go on
with their lives. Many work, pay taxes, marry, and start families, all while
their ultimate domiciliary fate hangs in the balance. If paroled aliens in
removal proceedings must return abroad before being allowed to adjust
status, many will suffer a statutory penalty of at least a three-year ban on
re-entry into the United States.26 This places a significant hardship on

18. Id. at 24.
19. Compare Ramos Bona v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 663, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) (following the
essential logic of Succar in invalidating 8 C.F.R. § 245.1 (c)(8) in the Ninth Circuit), and Zheng v.
Gonzales, 422 F.3d 98, 111-20 (3d Cir. 2005) (following Succar, but employing a different
analysis), with Mouelle v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 923, 928 (8th Cir. 2005) (upholding the regulation
and rejecting the logic of Succar).
20. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000)).
21. Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct
of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 444,452 (Jan. 3, 1997); Inspection and
Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings;
Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10326-27 (Mar. 6, 1997).
22. Succar v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 8, 32-34 (1st Cir. 2005).
23. Id. at 35.
24. Id. at 33-34.
25. See infra Part V.B.
26. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i) (West 2006) (barring non-citizens from reentry into
the United States for three years if they were unlawfully present in the United States for more than
180 days, but less than one year, and for ten years if they were unlawfully present for more than
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aliens and their families with legitimate adjustment of status claims. 2 7
In light of the revitalized but never ending debate surrounding
immigration, particularly illegal immigration in the United States, this
Note analyzes why § 245.1 (c)(8) was rightly invalidated by the First
Circuit Court of Appeals,28 both because it is contrary to congressional
intent, and because it places a draconian burden on many arriving aliens.
To this end, this Note will provide a brief overview of the INA and how
it has controlled and shaped immigration since its passage, with a
particular focus on understanding adjustment of status. It will also examine
the jurisdictional challenges that reviewing courts face, particularly in the
immigration context, and what tools may be used to divine congressional
intent in this important area of the law. It will then apply these principles
in the context of a burgeoning circuit split over § 245.1 (c)(8), and explain
the cases that have created the controversy. This Note will conclude with
a brief look at the quantitative and qualitative effects of such a regulation
on a population that Congress has sought to protect through consistent
policy in adjustment of status eligibility. Finally, this Note will suggest
why other federal circuits should follow the First Circuit's lead in striking
down § 245. 1(c)(8), and why, ultimately, the Supreme Court should do the
same.

II. A

BRIEF HISTORY OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY AcT

A. Modem Immigration Policy Takes Root
The United States has long been thought of as the world's modem
mecca of immigration. In many ways, the symbol of the Statue of Liberty
embodies all that made America great in its earliest days and beyond.29 In
apparent accordance with these principles, the first hundred years of the
Republic were characterized by a relatively liberal immigration system.3°

one year).
27. See Succar,394 F.3d at 18-19 (briefly summarizing the statutory matrix that would place
re-entry bans on paroled aliens in removal proceedings, creating a significant hardship on them and
their families).
28. See id. at 36.
29. The oft quoted poem The New Colossus by Emma Lazarus is engraved at the base of the
statue and reads in part, "Give me your tired, your poor, Your huddled masses yearning to breathe
free, the wretched refuse of your teeming shore. Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me, I lift
my lamp beside the golden door!" Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus (1883), reprintedin EMMA
LAZARus: SELECTIONS FROM HER POETRY AND PROSE 41 (Morris U. Schappes ed., rev. & enlarged
ed. 1947).
30. See generallyMichael R. Curran, FlickeringLamp Beside the Golden Door: Immigration,
the Constitution, & Undocumented Aliens in the 1990s, 30 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 57, 82-86

(1998) (outlining early immigration policy).
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As the twentieth century commenced, quotas began to dominate
immigration policy.3 The era of modern immigration policy, however, did
not really begin until the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952.32
The McCarran-Walter Act brought United States immigration policy
under the rubric of a single statute with three principle goals in mind. First,
the Act sought to reunify families.33 Second, the Act sought to protect the
domestic labor force. 4 Third, the Act sought to promote the immigration
of persons with needed skills. 35 Despite these laudable aspirations, the Act
has subsequently been described by commentators as "among the
country's most controversial policies, and with the exception of the
Internal Revenue Code represent[ing] the longest, most complicated, and
certainly the most arcane piece of legislation in modern United States
history." 36 Since its introduction, the Act has been altered or amended
dozens of times, in some cases with significant changes.3 7 Throughout the
history of Title 8, however, there has been a remarkable consistency in the
status of paroled aliens as eligible for adjustment.
B. IntroducingAdjustment of Status
Historically, obtaining an immigrant visa required an exit from the
United States so that an alien could acquire the visa at a United States
Consulate abroad. 8 With the passage of the 1952 Act, however, Congress
allowed aliens who were physically present in the United States to adjust
status to that of LPR without leaving the country. 39 The Act was then
amended in 1960 to include paroled aliens in the list of those aliens
eligible for the benefit.' The adjustment mechanism therefore allows

31. Id. at 93-95 (exploring quota policies around the turn of the century).
32. Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952). This Act established the basic structure of present
immigration law, codified under Title 8 of the United States Code. See IRA J. KuRZBAN,
KURZBAN'S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 1-20 (8th ed. 2002).
33. Curran, supra note 30, at 97.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.(quoting ELIZABETH HULL, WITHOUT JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
OF ALIENS 20 (1985)).
37. See, e.g., Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (including various new grounds of
removability and redefining the concept of "entry" to that of lawful admission); Immigration
Marriage Fraud Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537 (1986) (including
provisions for establishing legal permanent resident status based on marriage); Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (including the
establishment of various amnesty and legalization programs for certain groups of aliens).
38. See ROBERT C. DIVINE, IMMIGRATION PRACTICE § 8-7 (2005-2006 ed. 2005).
39. See McCarran-Walter Act, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163, 217 (1952).
40. See Pub. L. No. 86-648, 74 Stat. 504, 505 (1960).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss3/5
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aliens who are physically present in the United States, and who are
otherwise eligible for an immigrant visa, to become LPRs.4 1 The three
principle requirements necessary to be considered for adjustment are:
(1) the alien must make an adjustment application, (2) the alien must be
eligible to receive an immigrant visa and be admissible to the United
States for permanent residence, and (3) an immigrant visa must be
immediately available when the application is filed.4 2 If an alien meets
these requirements he may be adjusted to LPR at the discretion of the
Attorney General.43 One of the most typical bases for a visa to be available
for adjustment of an alien is on an immediate relative sponsorship petition,
which often is made by a spouse who is a United States citizen or LPR. 4
Many of those aliens who may be able to utilize an immediate relative
petition, however, are present in the United States on parole status only.
C. The Arriving Alien and the Concept of "Parole"
Prior to 1996, all aliens were classed into two categories: "(a)
applicants for admission and (b) non-citizens present in the United States
who had previously made an entry into the country either with, or without,
an inspection."45 Applicants for admission who were physically present in
the United States were considered to be "arriving alien[s]."' This rather
curious term referred to an individual who was physically present in the
United States-having "entered" the country-and had been inspected, but
who had not yet been cleared for admission.47 Although this definition has
remained essentially unchanged since its inception, the passage of LIRIRA
in 1996 eliminated the concept of "entry" and replaced it with
"admission."48 Today, the term "arriving alien" is defined by the Attorney
General's regulations broadly as "an applicant
for admission coming or
49
attempting to come into the United States.
When an alien arrives in the United States and is not clearly admissible,
the popular conception seems to be that he is detained until an
41. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255(a) (West 2006).
42. Id. For a detailed listing of the intricacies of these requirements, see KURZBAN, supra
note 32, at ch. 6, pt. I.
43. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255(a) (West 2006).
44. This form is styled "Petition for Alien Relative" (Form 1-130) by the United States
Government and is available for download at http://uscis.gov/graphics/formsfeelforms/i-130.htm.
After the approval of this petition, the alien must file another form to begin the actual adjustment
process. This form is styled "Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status" (Form
1-485) and is available for download at http://uscis.gov/graphicslformsfee/forms/i-485.htm.
45. Succar v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 2005).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-3575 (1996).
49.by8UF
C.F.R.
1.1(q) (2005).
Published
Law §Scholarship
Repository, 2006
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administrative inquiry into his status can be held. This conception,
however, broadly overestimates the number of aliens who are actually
detained at points of entry. This is because the Attorney General has been
granted discretion by Congress to "parole" aliens into the United States
pending an investigation into the legitimacy of their presence. 50 Generally,
this discretion may be exercised "temporarily under such conditions as [the
Attorney General] may prescribe only on a case-by-case basis for urgent
humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit."51 Congress has defined
the contours of parole in some detail by eliminating some aliens from
eligibility for parole,52 and prescribing the conditions of parole for others.53
The parole mechanism is widely used by immigration officials, and nearly
265,000 aliens were paroled into the United States in 2003.5' As a practical
matter, it is likely that most of these aliens are almost immediately placed
into removal proceedings because of the congressional direction that
"if ... an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt
entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a [removal]
proceeding... ."" Since, almost by definition, most parolees will not be
clearly and beyond a doubt admissible, they will find themselves placed
into removal proceedings.56 Understanding these classifications is a
necessary foundation for understanding why § 245.1(c)(8) is an
overreaching of the Attorney General's power. In order for a court to even
consider such a question, however, it first must resolve its subject matter
50. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (West 2006).
51. Id.
52. See id. § 1225(c)(1) (eliminating some aliens from any admission or parole for security
or on other grounds).
53. Id. § 182(d)(5)(A). Parole is always intended to be temporary and administered on a
case-by-case basis. Id. Once the purposes of the parole have been fulfilled, the alien must report
back to custody and have his case further adjudicated as an arriving alien. Id.
54. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2003 YEARBOOK OF

IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 83 (2004), http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/yearbook/2003/
2003Yearbook.pdf For a concise discussion of the different parole mechanisms and collected
statistics by such categories as year and port of entry, see id. at 81-84. Justice Clark described
parole as "simply a device through which needless confinement is avoided while administrative
proceedings are conducted." Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 190 (1958). He went on to note
in his Leng May Ma opinion that "[p]hysical detention of aliens is now the exception, not the rule,
and is generally employed only as to security risks or those likely to abscond." Id.
55. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (West 2006).
56. Parolees are not clearly entitled to admission, because if they were, their status would be
normalized. Therefore, most parolees must be placed into removal proceedings. See Succar v.
Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 8, 26-27 (1 st Cir. 2005) (explaining the logic of assuming most parolees to be
in removal proceedings); Ramos Bona v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 663, 669-70 (9th Cir. 2005)
(explaining further the logic enunciated inSuccar).Butsee Mouelle v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 923,930
n.9 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing a lack of supporting statistics and rebuttal evidence by the Attorney
General as reason to distrust the conclusion that most parolees are placed into removal
proceedings).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss3/5
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jurisdiction in the traditionally closed-door field of immigration.
DII. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY DECISIONS IN IMMIGRATION
A. The JurisdictionalProblem & "Pure" Questions of Law
The critical threshold question for any court reviewing an
administrative regulation is whether it has inherent or granted jurisdiction
to do so. In the field of immigration, the Supreme Court historically has
given Congress almost unreviewable deference.57 In fact, in the area of
exclusion, the Supreme Court has said that the power of Congress to order
exclusion of aliens on any bases that it chooses is "plenary.""8 The Court
further articulated its position in this area by stating that the exercise of
discretion by Congress's delegate will not be disturbed so long as the
executive discloses a "facially legitimate and bona fide reason" for the
decision.59 The reasons for this extraordinary deference are indeed
complex, but it would seem that they are bound up in the notion that the
judiciary does not belong in areas of foreign policy which may implicate
political questions.'
In accordance with this great deference, Congress has crafted its
immigration statutes to narrowly tailor jurisdiction for Article Ill courts to
review decisions of the Attorney General. For example, Congress has
circumscribed any judicial review in a number of matters where the
Attorney General has discretionary power-including matters of
adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255(a).61 This statutory
prohibition combined with the courts' general reticence to interfere in
immigration matters would seem to preclude judicial review of regulations
promulgated pursuant to a grant of discretionary power. The courts,
however, have nevertheless retained jurisdiction over the review of such

57. For a good discussion of the early development of immigration policy and the decisions
of the courts, see Curran, supra note 30, at 82-100.
58. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753,765-67 (1972); Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123
(1967); Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 343 (1909).
59. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 769-70.
60. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 305-06 (1993) (stating that there is no subject
over which legislative power is more complete than, the relationship between the United States and
alien visitors); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-82 (1976) (stating that political question
reasoning also governs deference to Congress and the President in the area of immigration and
naturalization); cf Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228,233-34 (1896) (noting that although
Congress has great power in the area of exclusion, it still must be exercised within constitutional
boundaries).
61. See generally 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252 (West 2006) (containing all matters relating to judicial
review); see specifically 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) (West 2006) (containing the prohibition on
judicial review of discretionary denials of adjustment of status).
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regulations in certain cases. 62
Specifically, the courts have never accepted the notion that pure
questions of law can be excised from judicial review, even where "plenary
power" in a field is accepted.63 As such, Article III courts have routinely
reviewed agency interpretations of statutes which often take the form of
regulations.64 The main goal of such a review is to determine if the agency
has overstepped its authority in promulgating a regulation beyond the
scope of the agency's statutory mandate.65 In 1984, the Supreme Court
attempted to define the parameters of this review when it decided Chevron
v. Natural Resources Defense Council.66 Chevron provided reviewing
courts with a framework for analyzing questions of statutory interpretation
by agencies.67 Such analysis is critical to understanding techniques which
are available to reviewing courts when ruling on the validity of regulations
such as § 245.1 (c)(8).
B. The Chevron Analysis and the AppropriateMeasure of Deference
Since Chevron was decided in 1984, it has produced as much
controversy as clarity.68 The Supreme Court in Chevron established a twostep framework for reviewing courts to analyze agency construction of
62. For a discussion about the wisdom of such judicial review in the immigration context,
see Melissa A. Flynn, Comment, Separationof Powers: Permissive JudicialReview or Invasion
of CongressionalPower?, 54 FLA. L. REV. 989, 996-99 (2002).
63. Compare Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (establishing the
principle that it is the province of the courts "to say what the law is"), with Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678, 687-88 (2001) (holding that a statutory jurisdictional bar to review of a discretionary
decision in the immigration context did not preclude judicial review of the extent of authority
granted to the Attorney General by the statute---essentially, a question of law), and United States
v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 544 (1940) (stating that the interpretation of statutes in
justiciable controversies is the prerogative of the courts). See also Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000) (recognizing the authority of the courts to settle questions of law in review
of administrative proceedings).
64. See, e.g., Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837,843 n.9 (1984) (reviewing
an EPA regulation and noting that the courts are the final word on statutory construction).
65. See id. at 843.
66. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
67. For a discussion and defense of the Chevron framework, see Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Chevron andIts Afternath: JudicialReview ofAgency Interpretationsof Statutory Provisions,41
VAND. L. REV. 301 (1988).
68. Compare Pierce, supra note 67, at 307-08, and Antonin Scalia, JudicialDeference to
Administrative Interpretationsof Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 514-15 (1989) (defending deference
to agency interpretation of law as a validation of congressional intent), with Cynthia R. Farina,
Statutory Interpretationand the Balance of Powerin the AdministrativeState, 89 COLuM. L. REV.
452, 487-88 (1989) (questioning the compatibility of Chevron with the non-delegation doctrine),
and Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulationand the Courts, 5 J. PoL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 517 (1986)
(arguing that the risk of special interest groups is too great to abrogate independent judicial review
of agency decisions).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss3/5

10

Bekiares: In Country, On Parole,IMMIGRATION
Out of Luck—Regulating
Away Alien Eligibil
POUCY

statutes. 69 The first step in the process is for courts to determine if
Congress has spoken to the particular issue at hand.7" Unfortunately, there
has never been full agreement as to what sources reviewing courts may use
to determine whether the issue has been resolved by Congress. 7' The first
and foremost method for determining if Congress has resolved a particular
issue in a statute is for courts to look at the plain meaning and text of the
statute itself and the statutory scheme as a whole.72 If the statute on its face
is unambiguous, then the inquiry is at an end, and the regulation may stand
or fall based on the court's level of satisfaction that the agency's
interpretation comports with the plain meaning of the statute. If, however,
the statute is not clear on its face, then some courts choose to use
legislative history to resolve step-one questions. 73 This analysis often
involves looking at whether Congress has considered the issue in previous
iterations of the statute, and what debate has surrounded the issue.74 If
congressional intent can be divined from such an analysis, then, once
again, the inquiry need not proceed past step-one.
When it cannot be determined if Congress has resolved the issue in the
text of the statute, reviewing courts must proceed to step-two of the
analysis. 75 Step-two involves ajudicial determination of whether Congress
has committed a particular issue to agency discretion, or whether it simply

69. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
70. Id. at 842.
71. The confusion over which sources may be used to determine congressional intent can
probably be blamed on the Chevron decision itself. The decision never clearly enumerates which
sources may be used in a step-one analysis. It seems clear, however, that, at the very least, a plain
reading of the statute and an application of simple principles of statutory construction are in order.
See id. at 859-62. It is also likely that Chevron authorizes reviewing courts to look at legislative
history in their analyses. See id. at 862-64. But see K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281,293
n.4 (1988) (calling any reference to legislative history in Chevron step-one analysis "irrelevant").
Conversely, the Chevron Court seemed to frown upon considerations of policy, which it perceived
as better left to the legislative process. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864-66.
72. For an enunciation of this principle and citations to cases which reaffirm it, see K Mart
Corp., 486 U.S. at 291 (citing Chevron's direction to look at the text of the statute to determine any
clearly expressed intent of Congress); Bethesda Hosp. Ass'n. v. Bowen, 485 U.S. 399,405 (1988)
(endorsing the technique of looking at the language and design of a statute as a whole in Chevron
step-one analysis).
73. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 137-38 (2000)
(effectively using legislative history to demonstrate how Congress has foreclosed regulation in a
particular industry).
74. This is a traditional technique of statutory interpretation and was relied upon heavily by
the First Circuit in Succar, where that court noted that Congress's language in its adjustment of
status statute had not significantly changed-at least with respect to eligibility standards-since
its first introduction. See Succar v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 8, 16 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting that Congress
had more than a dozen opportunities to excise parolees, as a group, from the class of aliens eligible
to adjust and chose not to do so).
75. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
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has been overlooked or omitted by the statute.76 If the court determines
that an issue has been committed to agency discretion, then the court will
only overturn the interpretation if it is "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute."77 If, however, the court determines that the issue
was simply omitted from the statute's scope, and therefore the
responsibility has fallen to the agency to fill the gap, then the only
determination to be made is whether the agency's interpretation is a
reasonable one. 78 Step-two analysis has not been as widely used by the
lower courts as step-one, but it involves many of the same techniques for
trying to discern congressional intent, such as resorting to legislative
history and deciphering the statutory scheme.79 In the absence of
discernable congressional intent, an alternative approach to resolving
ambiguities may be a resort to old methods of statutory construction.
C. Application of the Immigration Rule of Lenity
One technique that has been proposed for resolving statutory
ambiguities in the immigration context is use of the traditional
immigration rule of lenity as a canon of statutory construction.8 ° This rule
suggests that ambiguities in immigration statutes should be resolved in
favor of the alien.81 There would seem to be good language in Supreme
Court decisions to support such a position. 2 The Court has often equated
removal of aliens with the idea of "banishment" and "exile."83 Such

76. Id. In step-two, a reviewing court must determine if there has been an "explicit"
delegation to the agency or an "implicit" one. Id. at 844.
77. Id. at 843-44. This would be an "explicit" delegation situation. Id.
78. Id. at 844. This would be an "implicit" delegation situation. Id.
79. See, e.g., Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 415 F.3d 364, 369, 373-75 (4th Cir. 2005)
(applying Chevron step-two analysis to a regulation promulgated pursuant to the Family and
Medical Leave Act); Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v. Boutris, 419 F.3d 949, 959 (9th Cir. 2005)
(applying a Chevron step-two analysis to a provision of the Bank Act).
80. See generally Brian G. Slocum, The ImmigrationRule ofLenity and Chevron Deference,
17 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 515 (2003) (proposing the revival and use of the immigration rule of lenity
as being consistent with Chevron and good public policy).
81. Id. at 516.
82. Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's statement in a case involving potential
deportation that "[w]hen Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of imputing to Congress an
undeclared will, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity.... It may fairly be said to be
a presupposition of our law to resolve doubts... against the imposition of a harsher punishment."
Bonetti v. Rogers, 356 U.S. 691, 699 (1958) (quoting Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83
(1955)). The Bonetti Court went on to say, "we cannot 'assume that Congress meant to trench on
[an alien's] freedom beyond that which is required by the narrowest of several possible meanings
of the words used."' Bonetti, 356 U.S. at 699 (quoting Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10
(1948) (alteration in original)).
83. See Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 791 (1988) (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment) (likening the punishment of denaturalization for making false statements to "exile" and
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emphasis would seem to support the notion that immigration statutes
should be construed by courts in the light most favorable to the alien. If
this were accepted, courts should invalidate any regulations which do not
resolve ambiguities in such a light.
It is unclear, however, that such a technique would be consistent with
the dictates of Chevron. If there is a step-one analysis taking place, then
the immigration rule of lenity would seem to be an unnecessary
consideration. If Congress has spoken to the issue, then the matter is
ended, no matter how favorable or unfavorable the statute is to the alien.
This is especially true in the field of immigration-more particularly
exclusion-where the Supreme Court has declared Congress's power to
be plenary. 84 In a step-two analysis, however, the rule may well prove very
useful. If a reviewing court determines that there has been either an
express or implied delegation of authority by Congress in the statute, it
may still apply the immigration rule of lenity to determine if the agency
action was either arbitrary and capricious or unreasonable. For example,
in the case of § 245. 1(c)(8), a reviewing court may choose to use a steptwo analysis and apply the immigration rule of lenity in determining that
the regulation is unreasonable as being too unfavorable to aliens in the face
of ambiguity.85 Such an analysis, however, surely would not be without its
own controversy, as it is exactly this kind of use of canons of construction
that the Supreme Court was trying to limit in its decision in Chevron.86
D. Due Process Concerns-AreAliens Owed Any Rights at All?
A final important consideration when examining judicial review of
agency decisions in immigration law is the level of constitutional concern
which must be given to such matters. A plain reading of the Constitution
would suggest that aliens should be owed the same due process rights
under the Fifth87 and Fourteenth 88 Amendments as citizens of the United
States. This is because the Due Process Clause of each of these
amendments declares that the federal and state governments may not

"banishment"); Fong Haw Tan, 333 U.S. at 10 (calling deportation a drastic measure which is
sometimes the equivalent of "banishment" or "exile").
84. See Boutillier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967); Cha Chan Ping v. United States, 130
U.S. 581,608 (1889) (declaring the power of excluding foreigners to be "an incident of sovereignty
belonging to the government of the United States").
85. For such an example, see infra Part IV.C of this Note and the discussion of Zheng v.
Gonzales,422 F.3d 98 (3d Cir. 2005).
86. For a warning about how a resort to such canons of statutory construction might well
constitute an "evisceration" of Chevron, see INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. 421, 454 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
87. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
88. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law.89 The juxtaposition of this language with the reference to any citizen
in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment9 °
would seem to bolster the point of view that the framers intended the Due
Process Clause to apply to anyone physically within the jurisdiction of the
United States.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has pointed out that aliens who are
subject to exclusion from the country correspondingly may be subject to
abridged due process rights.91 The logic of this seems to be that aliens who
have not yet been found to be admissible to the country are constructively
considered to be still outside of its borders, and thus they are treated as if
they were still at the border seeking entry.92 Therefore, since Congress
already has plenary powers over aliens, it can dictate whatever process it
feels is due to such aliens.93 Such logic would, of course, cover the entire
category of arriving aliens and the subset of parolees with which
§ 245.1(c)(8) deals.
This discussion of due process rights for arriving aliens may logically
seem to end when one considers the Supreme Court's pronouncements to
date on the matter.94 This inquiry, however, would seem to be altered in
the special circumstances that applications for adjustment of status often
entail. This is because, not only are the due process rights of the individual
alien at stake, but if the adjustment application is based on a marriage or
other familial relation to a United States citizen or LPR, the unquestioned
due process rights of that individual are also at stake. 95 Since the Court

89. U.S. CONST amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. For a discussion of cases which
have found process due to immigrants in various situations and an argument for their extension, see
Evelyn H. Cruz, Double the Injustice, Twice the Harm: The Impact of the Board of Immigration
Appeals's Summary Affirmance Procedures,16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 481, 486 (2005).
90. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
91. The Supreme Court could not have been clearer with its language in this regard when it
said, "Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied
entry is concerned." United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950)
(citation omitted).
92. The Court elucidated this position three years after the Knauff case when it stated, "It is
true that aliens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after
proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law....
But an alien on the threshold of initial entry stands on a different footing .... " Shaughnessy v.
United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
93. See id.
94. Such as, for example, the cited decisions in Knauff and Shaughnessy. But see Landon v.
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (recognizing the ability to invoke due process rights in the
exclusion context where a former resident alien was seeking to reenter the United States).
95. For an excellent discussion of the due process rights which might attach in this
circumstance, see David Moyce, Comment, Petitioningon Behalfofan Alien Spouse: Due Process
Under the Immigration Laws, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1747, 1761 (1986). But see Shaneela Khan,
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repeatedly has extolled the virtues of marriage as a bedrock in our
society, 96 one would think that considerations of due process would have
extra significance in cases of adjustment of status based on marriage. 97
With these established and theoretical sources of statutory interpretation
available, a challenge to the validity of § 245.1 (c)(8) might have seemed
inevitable. In 2005, the Courts of Appeals began to hear a multitude of just
such petitions.
IV. SUCCAR V. ASHCROFTANALYZED: SECTION 245.1 (c)(8), THE DEATH
OF A BAD REGULATION?

A. The Facts of the Case
Wissam Succar is a native and citizen of Lebanon. 98 He first arrived in
the United States in October 1998, and immediately began the process of
applying for asylum. 99 He was then placed into removal proceedings and
was paroled into the United States pending a full hearing on his asylum
application." ° His parole status had not changed through the date of his
hearing.10 ' Succar's application for asylum was denied by the immigration
judge, and Succar appealed the decision to the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA)."'0 During the pendancy of his appeal, Succar married a
United States citizen.'0 3 Succar's wife then filed an 1-130 visa petition for
Succar which was approved in April 2001." Succar subsequently
proceeded to file an 1-485 petition for adjustment of status based on the
approval of the 1-130, and the case was remanded to the immigration judge

AlienatingourNation 'sLegal PermanentResidents:An Analysis ofDenmore v. Kim andits Impact
on America's Immigration System, 24 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JuDGEs 113 (2004) (suggesting
that the Supreme Court's decision to deny traditional notions of due process to LPRs in the context
of bail hearings evinces a willingness to deny due process for LPRs).
96. This language can be seen in almost every facet of society including government and
popular parlance. The Supreme Court made such an announcement when it stated that marriage
created "the most important relation in life" and in civilized society. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190,
205 (1888).
97. See Moyce, supra note 95, at 1771.
98. Succar v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 2005).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. The BIA functions as the appellate court for decisions of the country's immigration
judges. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (b) (West 2005). It is part of the Executive Office for Immigration Review
(EOIR), id. § 1003.1 (a)(1), which in turn is organized under the Department of Justice.
103. Succar, 394 F.3d at 11. The marriage took place in February, 2001, nearly two and a half
years after his initial entry into the United States. Id.
104. ld.
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for consideration of the petition.' 5
On remand, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)' took
the position that Succar was not eligible to adjust status because he was a
paroled alien in removal proceedings, and thus was barred by 8 C.F.R.
§ 245.1(c)(8) from applying for this benefit."°7 The immigration judge
found this argument to be persuasive and denied the adjustment
application as a matter of law. 118 Succar timely appealed on the denial of
the application, and the BIA affirmed the immigration judge's opinion in
all respects."°9 Succar then appealed the decision to the First Circuit Court
of Appeals. "' He asserted that the regulation was invalid as being contrary
to the clearly expressed intent of Congress, and that the Attorney General
acted beyond the scope of his power in promulgating it."'
B. Asserting JurisdictionandApplying Chevron Step-One
The Attorney General immediately challenged Succar's appeal on the
grounds that the First Circuit lacked the necessary jurisdiction to hear the
challenge to the regulation." 2 The Attorney General supported this
position by positing that 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(a)(2)(B) precludes judicial13
review of discretionary agency determinations on adjustment of status.'
The First Circuit, however, rejected this argument and exercised review.' 14
The First Circuit found its jurisdictional base in Succarby determining
that the issue in the case was a pure question of law, which by definition
does not fall outside of Article II jurisdiction. 1"' The court was quick to
point out that this case presented a question not of discretion, but rather of
statutory interpretation, which is always within the province of the federal
courts.

16

As such, review of the regulation was proper because it was an

exercise in whether the Attorney General had acted within the scope of his

105. Id. Succar filed the motion with the BIA to remand the proceedings. Id.
106. The INS was reorganized in 2003 under the Department of Homeland Security, and its
functions were transferred to the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). See 6
U.S.C.A. § 542 (West 2006). For purposes of this Note, the service will be referred to as the INS.
107. Succar, 394 F.3d at 11.
108. Id. at 12. Specifically, the immigration judge stated that"I am confident that I don't have
the authority to adjust status to someone who's an arriving alien." Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.at 21.
112. Id.at 19.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 19 n.15. See also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,688 (2001) (exercising judicial
review over a challenge to the extent of the Attorney General's post-removal detention powers,
because his ability to act was "not a matter of discretion").
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authority in promulgating § 245.1(c)(8),
' l17 which the court described as "a
classic issue for the court to decide."
After the court had decided that an exercise of review was proper, it
moved on to determining the validity of the regulation vis-A-vis that
statute." 8 In order to do this, the court utilized the Chevron framework to
analyze whether the regulation was a valid use of the Attorney General's
power." 9 As such, the inquiry began with a determination of whether
Congress had specifically addressed in the statute the issue of parolees'
eligibility to adjust status. 20 This step-one analysis led the court to
conclude that the statute was unambiguous on the issue of whether
parolees should be eligible and that the clarity of the statute worked
against the Attorney General's interpretation.' 2 ' The court in Succar thus
clear
declined even to reach step-two of the Chevron analysis, as the
122
congressional intent was discernable from the face of the statute.
In reaching its decision, the Succar court relied heavily both on plain
text analysis and legislative history to provide the justification for why it
believed that Congress had spoken to the issue of parolees' eligibility.
First, the court explained that the face of the enabling statute clearly states
that adjustment of status is available to those aliens who have been
"inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States."'123 This plain
language clearly shows congressional intent that aliens who have been
paroled should be eligible for adjustment. However, § 245.1(c)(8)
completely eliminates a huge class of aliens who otherwise would be
eligible to be considered for adjustment.124 The court also pointed out that

117. Succar, 394 F.3d at 19.
118. Id.at 20.
119. Id.at 22.
120. Id. The Succarcourt began its analysis here by relying on the seminal immigration case
of INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. 421, 447-48 (1987) (quoting Chevron v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)) (holding that the judiciary has final authority on issues of
statutory construction and if a clear congressional intent is present, then that is the law which must
be given effect). Succar, 394 F.3d at 22.
121. Id. at 24.
122. Id. at 35-36.
123. Id. at 24 (quoting 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255(a)) (emphasis added).
124. The Attorney General disputes this claim in Succar as well as in the subsequent Eighth
Circuit case of Mouelle v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 923,930 n.9 (8th Cir. 2005), in which he argued that
the number of paroled aliens placed in removal proceedings was not so great as to effectively
eliminate this class. This claim seems statistically dubious, however, in light of other available
figures relating to parole and adjustment of status. Given that the adjustment mechanism is so
heavily used as a means of attaining legal permanent residence, it seems incongruous that only
1,957 paroled persons in fiscal year 1999 adjusted status out of a total 263,755 persons who were
paroled that year. See DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURrrY, U.S. C=IzENSIuP AND IMMIGRATION
SERVICES, USE OFTHE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PAROLE AUTHORITY UNDER THE IMMIGRATION AND
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the enabling statute contains a long list of exceptions in which certain
aliens who might otherwise be eligible for adjustment cannot be
considered. 25 Thus, the text of the statute evinces a congressional plan
which has been well thought out in terms of eligibility requirements, but
which the regulation has all but totally eviscerated.
Second, the court used legislative history to demonstrate why it
believed that Congress must have intended to reserve the power to define
eligibility for adjustment unto itself, and not to confer it away to the
Attorney General. 26 The main support for the court's position came from
the reasons expressed by Congress for the original passage of the
amendments to the adjustment provisions in 1960.127 Congress evidently
became concerned both with the needless trips out of the country (most
typically to Canada) that aliens eligible to become LPRs had to undertake
in order to obtain a visa and also the hardship which these trips placed on
them and their families.128 Congress was equally concerned about the
number of private relief bills that were spawned because of the arcane
process in place."19 In order to mitigate these problems, Congress crafted
its amendments to the adjustment provisions to streamline the process for
eligible aliens. 3 °
The court further supported this position through a recollection of the
relatively high level of stability that the adjustment provisions have
enjoyed in the INA since they were amended in 1960, even after the
passage of the landmark I RIRA. 31 The Attorney General made the point
that one of the central purposes in the passage of IRIRA was to make the
process of removal of aliens more efficient and effective, and that
§ 245.1(c)(8) works toward achieving that goal. 132 The court responded,
however, that the fact that the statutory eligibility of parolees to adjust
status had not changed since 1960-not even after the passage of
IIRIRA-was clear proof that
Congress still intended for these aliens to be
133
consideration.
for
eligible
The Attorney General, however, did not end his defense of the
regulation with a mere challenge to jurisdiction and reliance on traditional

repsstudies/parolerpt9899.pdf.
125. Succar, 394 F.3d at 29 (referring to the 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255 list of adjustment exceptions).
126. Id. at 30-34.
127. Id. at 32-33.
128. Id. (citing S. Rep. No. 86-1651 (1960), as reprintedin 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3124, 3136).
129. Id. at 33.
130. See id. at 33-34 (providing a more detailed analysis of the three main problems that
Congress wished to address including hardship to aliens and their families).
131. Id. at 34-35.
132. See Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 444,452 (Jan.
3, 1997).
133. Succar, 394 F.3d at 35.
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notions of deference to agency interpretation. Rather, he continued his
argument by claiming that the regulation itself was nothing more than the
manifestation of the discretion that the statute had granted him. 34
' In other
words, the choice not to consider an adjustment application from paroled
aliens in removal proceedings was simply a quasi-preemptive exercise of
discretion. The court rejected this argument on the grounds that, while the
Attorney General is authorized to exercise his discretion in granting or
denying adjustment applications, he is not authorized to rewrite the
categories of eligibility for the benefit.1 35 In making this point, the court
distinguished the case of Lopez v. Davis,136 in which the Supreme Court
upheld the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) use of discretion in categorically
excluding a group of prisoners from a benefit as an exercise of
discretion. 137 The Succarcourt felt that the statute at issue in Lopez did not
give the agency any inherent guidance in distinguishing between groups
1 38
of prisoners who should receive the benefit, and those who should not.
In 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255, however, Congress had indeed provided the
Attorney General with a clear indication of which aliens would be
inherently eligible for the benefit-namely, those who have been inspected
and admitted, and those who have been paroled.'39 As such, the Attorney
General was not free in his discretion to dictate out of hand which aliens
would be excluded from even being considered for adjustment. Rather, the
Attorney General is only free to exercise his discretion negatively against
aliens after they have been given a fair chance to be heard on the merits of
their claim if they are statutorily eligible.
The court's analysis in Succar is complex, but fundamentally sound.
The court chose to use the full breadth of a Chevron step-one analysis to
reach the conclusion that § 245.1 (c)(8) not only is an overestimation of
what the statutory term "discretion" implies in such a context, but also that
it is contrary to a public policy that Congress had carefully crafted,
considered, and reconsidered over a long period of time. Although the
Succar court chose to effectuate the invalidation of § 245.1(c)(8) by

134. See id. at 26-30.
135. Id. at 29.
136. 531 U.S. 230 (2001).
137. Id. at 233. Specifically, the Court held that it was permissible for the Bureau of Prisons
to categorically deny a class of prisoners who might be eligible for a sentencing reduction benefit
under the enabling statute, because of the nature of their offense. Id. at 232-33.
138. Succar, 394 F.3d at 28-29. The enabling statute in Lopez read, "The period a prisoner
convicted of a nonviolent offense remains in custody after successfully completing a treatment
program may be reduced by the Bureau of Prisons, but such reduction may not be more than one
year from the term the prisoner must otherwise serve." Lopez, 531 U.S. at 233. The Bureau of
Prisons sought to categorically deny the benefit to any "prisoners whose current offense is a felony
attended by 'the carrying, possession, or use of a firearm."' Id. at 232-33 (citation omitted).
139. See Succar, 394 F.3d at 29.
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utilizing a Chevron step-one analysis, subsequent cases have shown that
the logic of a step-two analysis likewise can be used for the same purpose.
C. An Alternate Method of Invalidation-ReachingChevron Step-Two
Shortly after Succar was decided, the Third Circuit heard Zheng v.
Gonzales.140 In Zheng, the court was called upon to consider a question
very similar to that presented in Succar. Specifically, the court was asked
to pass on the validity of § 245.1(c)(8), 14 1 in the case of a Chinese national
who sought to adjust status and was denied any review by the Attorney
General based
on his classification as a paroled alien in removal
142
proceedings.
Zheng first arrived in the United States in or after 1990, and entered the
country without inspection. 141 Zheng returned to China briefly in 1993, and
was readmitted to the United States on a grant of advance parole.' 44 He
initially filed his application for adjustment of status in 1993 based on
protections under the Chinese Student Protection Act. 145 The application
was not ruled on until six years later in 1999 when the Attorney General
denied it.' 46 The INS then immediately initiated removal proceedings
against Zheng, who attempted to renew his application for adjustment
before an immigration judge at a hearing in 2001 for an asylum application
filed by Zheng's attorney. 147 The attempted renewal was denied by
the
1 48
immigration judge, however, citing § 245. 1(c)(8) (citation altered).
Although the BIA affirmed the ruling of the immigration judge, the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, and invalidated the regulation. 149
After a brief jurisdictional statement which adopted the logic of Succar,"5°
140. 422 F.3d 98 (3d Cir. 2005).
141. The court in Zheng referred to the regulation by its alternate designation of
§ 1245.1(c)(8). This author has chosen to continue to refer to the regulation as § 245.1(c)(8)
throughout for the sake of clarity, but this alteration will be noted parenthetically where necessary.
142. Zheng, 422 F.3d at 102-03.
143. Id. at 103.
144. Id. Advance parole is a process whereby aliens may be granted permission to travel
abroad with the express understanding that they will be readmitted to the United States upon their
return, and will thereby be in parole status. For an official definition of advance parole, see OFFICE
OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 54, at 190.
145. Zheng, 422 F.3d at 103-04. The Chinese Student Protection Act of 1992 was an act to
suspend deportation of Chinese Nationals present in the United States and grant permanent
residency under certain conditions, and was considered to be a response to the Tiananmen Square
incident. Pub. L. No. 404, 106 Stat. 1969 (1992).
146. Zheng, 422 F.3d at 104.
147. Id.
148. id.
149. Id. at 124.
150. Id.at 111. Interestingly, the Zheng court stated that the government, presumably after the
adverse ruling in Succar, no longer disputed the jurisdiction that the courts of appeals have to
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"'
the court moved on to a Chevron analysis of the regulation's validity.15
Unlike the First Circuit, however, the Third Circuit found that a step-one
analysis of § 245.1 (c)(8) (citationaltered)was inadequate to dispose of the
regulation.152 This is because the court considered the statute to be
ambiguous enough to warrant a further exploration of the matter under
step-two. In making this determination, the court noted that the logic of
Lopez v. Davis 53 dictated that ambiguity in eligibility requirements under
similar situations did not foreclose
an agency from placing regulatory
54
restrictions on such eligibility.
In its step-two analysis, the court found that the regulation was still an
invalid exercise of the Attorney General's discretion.155 Although it did not
specifically say so, the court appears to have approached the issue as an
implicit grant of power to the Attorney General by the statute as opposed
to an explicit one. This appears so since the language that the court uses
is couched in terms of reasonableness of the regulation as opposed to an
arbitrary and capricious review. 56Such a standard would appear to contain
a much higher level of inherent deference to the agency's decision making,
but the court found nevertheless that the regulation was unreasonable in
light of the clear intent of Congress to structure carefully the statutory
eligibility scheme.157 This holding further exposes § 245.1 (c)(8) for the
poorly crafted regulation that it is. The court's adoption and further
elaboration of the Succar findings as they related to congressional history
and intent highlight the overreaching quality of the regulation and
deservingly brand it as decidedly unreasonable.
There is an initial temptation to question whether there is really any
legitimacy to the two-step Chevron analysis at all after a comparison of
Succar and Zheng. Afterall, both courts ultimately invalidated
§ 245.1 (c)(8), and both appeared to rely on legislative intent in crafting the
eligibility requirements for adjustment of status as their primary
justification for the invalidation, despite the fact that they used different
steps in the analysis.' 58 Such a reading, however, would overlook an
important distinction. The First Circuit in Succar held the regulation

review the regulation. Id.
151. Id. at 112-13.
152. Id. at 116.
153. 531 U.S. 230 (2001).
154. Zheng, 422 F.3d at 116 n.14.
155. Id. at 120.
156. See id. at 116.
157. Id. at H18-20.
158. Compare Succar v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 8, 24 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding against the
regulation under a step-one analysis because Congress had spoken to the issue), with Zheng, 422
F.3d at 116, 119-20 (finding against the regulation under a step-two analysis, because ambiguity
in the statute required moving past step-one).
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invalid as plainly contrary to the text of 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255(a), and in so
doing, rejected the logic of Lopez. Presumably, this would mean that the
Attorney General could not subsequently craft any regulation altering
eligibility requirements for paroled aliens which would satisfy that court.
By contrast, the Third Circuit in Zheng held that the regulation was invalid
as merely being unreasonable in light of 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255(a), and in so
doing, upheld the logic of Lopez. Presumably, this in turn would mean that
the Attorney General might yet craft a regulation affecting eligibility for
paroled aliens as long as it could be found to be reasonable.'59 Thus,
although the Zheng holding appears to move § 245.1 (c)(8) closer to the
regulatory graveyard, it may not signal an end to pre-emptive
disqualification of at least some paroled aliens for purposes of adjusting
status.
D. A Continuationof Validity?
The Succar reasoning has not met with universal acceptance in the
short time since the case was decided. In the case of Mouelle v.
Gonzales,"6 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals heard a challenge to
§ 245.1(c)(8) and rejected the logic of Succar.'6 1 In so doing, the Eighth
Circuit has provided an alternative
course for other circuits to follow in
62
reviewing the regulation. 1
In Mouelle, Petitioner was a native and citizen of the Republic of
Congo, who first entered the United States as a student in 1989.163 He
became a paroled alien after a brief visit to Canada and a subsequent return
to the United States in 1997.164 In 1998, removal proceedings were
commenced against him.' 65 In 2003, Petitioner and his wife filed

159. It is difficult to know what the form of such a regulation might look like, but certainly
not impossible to conceive. Given the fact that there are multiple categories of paroled aliens, and
aliens who are paroled on many different grounds or justifications, it is possible to picture a
regulation which more narrowly restricts eligibility and would no longer offend a reasonableness
inquiry such as that which the Third Circuit applied.
160. 416 F.3d 923 (8th Cir. 2005).
161. Id. at 927-28.
162. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals also has heard a case in which § 245. 1(c)(8) was
challenged, but it did not reach the question of the provision's validity because the court considered
the alien's argument on this issue to be waived because it was untimely brought to the court's
attention. Diarra v. Gonzales, No. 04-60097, 137 F. App'x 627, 631-32 (5th Cir. 2005). The
Eleventh Circuit dismissed a similar case without considering the validity of § 245.1 (c)(8) because
of an untimely challenge. Shah v. U.S. Att'y Gen., No. 05-10587, 151 F. App'x 748,751 6-7 (11 th
Cir. 2005). Consequently the question of validity presumably is still an open one in these circuits.
163. Mouelle, 416 F.3d at 924.
164. Id. at 925.
165. Id.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss3/5
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applications to adjust status based on her employment."6 The BIA denied
their petition to have their applications considered before an immigration
judge, however, because it67 found them ineligible as being "arriving aliens"
in removal proceedings.

On appeal, the Mouelles challenged the validity of § 245.1 (c)(8) based
on the logic of Succar.168 The Eighth Circuit, however, stated its
disagreement with that decision. 69 Significantly, the majority immediately
noted in its discussion of the regulation's validity that it did not believe
that a Chevron step-one analysis was appropriate in such a case. 170 It
centered its support for this argument on the discretionary nature of the
statute itself.17' Specifically, the court believed that the discretion granted
to the Attorney General by 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255(a) represented a firm
expression of congressional intent to grant wide latitude, not only in
72
processing adjustment claims, but also in defining eligibility for them.
Although the Mouelle court engaged in very little discussion of
Chevron, and specifically stated that it believed the case to be
inappropriately evaluated under step-one, the terms that the majority used
in its opinion were right in line with such analysis. The court's focus on
the requirements for eligibility were consistent with either a Chevron stepone or step-two analysis. Since the court believed that eligibility could be
defined as a matter of discretion, it clearly believed that congressional
intent dictates such a result. 173 Furthermore, the court goes on to use the
language of reasonableness when describing the classification in relation
to the expressed congressional desire to expedite removal of arriving
aliens. 74 Such language is a classic sign of a gap-filling step-two
analysis. 75 Unlike the Zheng court, however, the Mouelle majority found

166. Id. at 925-26.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 927-28. Like the later Zheng court, the Mouelle court referred to 8 C.F.R.
§ 1245.1(c)(8), but this note will continue to refer to it as 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(c)(8) for the sake of
continuity.
169. Id. at 928.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 928-29.
173. See id. at 929. In reaching this conclusion, the court-much like the Third Circuit in the
later Zheng case--cited agreement with the Lopez decision in such contexts. Id. The court used the
logic of Lopez to ask, "[Wihy should the Attorney General be forced to exercise his discretion
through rules that speak only to the ultimate relief rather than eligibility?... [I]t makes little sense
to invalidate this regulation simply because it speaks in terms of eligibility." Id. (citation omitted).
174. Id. at 930.
175. As a conclusion to its analysis, the court referred to the reformation goals of IIRIRA and
the stated intent of the Attorney General to promulgate regulations which would effectuate the
congressional desire to shorten removal proceedings. Id. Interestingly, however, the court did not
at all address
made in Succar
that continuity
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the Attorney General's interpretation of17 the
statute to be perfectly
6
regulation.
the
upheld
thus
reasonable, and
The decision in Mouelle does indeed represent a defense for
§ 245.1 (c)(8), and could provide the Supreme Court, if it chose to hear
such a case, with a possible blueprint for its continued validity. A focus on
reasonableness always provides an avenue for legitimate debate. In the
wider context of immigration law, however, the decision does not make
sense. The face of 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255(a) appears clear with regard to
Congress's intent for paroled aliens to be eligible, and any interpretation
to the contrary would seem to contravene notions of congressional intent,
public policy, and even due process. By placing these concerns in a realworld context, the final substantive section of this Note demonstrates why
traditional canons of statutory construction-in this case the immigration
rule of lenity-still should be relied upon to settle close questions such as
those presented by the validity of harsh regulations like § 245.1 (c)(8).
V. THE FIGURES AND THE FACES BEHIND THEM-TOWARD
UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT

A. Empirical Data
It would be easy to synthasize the cases which have invalidated
§ 245.1(c)(8) as simply holding that the regulation is contrary to
congressional intent, and therefore an unauthorized exercise of agency
interpretation. This alone would be enough to recommend to those federal
circuits that have not yet considered cases dealing with the validity of
§ 245.1 (c)(8) to strike down the regulation. A purely academic analysis
may end just there. It would be a mistake, however, to overlook the human
impact of regulations such as this-which, of course, is often the very
impetus for good law and policy, particularly in the area of immigration.
Such a component deserves at least a brief overview, to create a kind of 'zaxis' of depth to these issues, for future courts to examine when
considering such cases.
The sheer size of immigration numbers in the United States is
impressive. Between the years of 1991 and 2000, over 9,000,000 people
immigrated to the United States.177 Significantly, although the numbers
have fluctuated from year to year since the passage of the INA, total
immigration has not appreciably dropped off since the passage of the
INA, even in the face of such sweeping reforms as IIRIRA, seems to be strong evidence of
congressional intent for such eligibility to remain open. See Succar v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 8, 24 (1 st
Cir. 2005).
176. The panel in Mouelle split with Circuit Judge Bye, filing a lone short dissent in favor of
the logic of Succar. Id. at 931.
177. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 54, at 11.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss3/5
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IIRIRA in 1996.178 Additionally, between the years of 2000 and 2003 there
were over 1,000,000 persons paroled into the United States. 179 In 2001 and
2002, over 60% of all persons who immigrated180to the United States did so
through the adjustment of status mechanism.
Looking at such figures is not only helpful in understanding the size of
the immigrant class in the United States, but also in examining its qualities
in order to better understand the sometimes draconian effects that
§ 245.1(c)(8) can have. In 2004, almost 66% of all persons who became
LPRs of the United States did so on a family-sponsored basis. 8 ' Of those
who adjusted on this basis, 60.1% were married. 18 2 Moreover, one study
published in 1999 by the Urban Institute found that 85% of immigrant
families (those families with at least one non-citizen parent) in the United
States are "mixed-status" families-meaning that they are a mix between
United States citizens and aliens. 183 Such figures indicate strong family ties
between the United States and aliens present in this country. Breaking
apart such families by disallowing parolees to adjust can have serious
consequences for the long term stability of these unions. Consider an
immigrant in Succar's position: If such an immigrant's adjustment claim
is not granted, for example, he likely would be removed from the United
184
States and would be barred from re-entry for a period of ten years.
These figures remind us why dialogue about immigration in the United
States is of such central importance. Immigration is a vital part of the

178. See id. (providing statistics for total immigration from 1820 to 2003).
179. See id. at 81.
180. Id. at 7. For a snapshot of delays in the front end processing of adjustment of status
claims, including national statistics, see Victor Manuel Ramos, OrlandoDelays Keep Immigrants
in Limbo, ORLANDOSENTINEL, Oct. 23,2005, at Al. For an editorial view of how immigration-case
backlogs harm the United States' interest in family unity and economic productivity, see AMERICAN
IMMIGRATION LAW FOUNDATION, IMMIGRATION POLICY BRIEF, THE ENDLESS WAIT: WILL
RESOURCES MATCH THE RESOLVE To REDUCE THE IMMIGRATION CASE BACKLOG? (2004),

http://www.ailf.orglipc/endlesswaitprint.asp.
181. See OFFICE OFIMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP'T OF HOMELAND

SEC., CHARACTERISTICS

OF FAMILY SPONSORED LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENTS: 2004 1-2 (2005), http://uscis.gov/

graphics/shared/statistics/publications/FSFamSponsoredLPR2004.pdf. This number was calculated
using the numbers in Table 1 where 620,429 of the total 946,142 LPRs were family sponsored. Id.
at 2.
182. Id.
183. MICHAEL E. Fix & WENDY ZIMMERMANN,URBAN INST., ALL UNDER ONE ROOF: MIXEDSTATUS FAMILIES IN AN ERA OF REFORM 2 (1999), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/
409100.pdf.
184. See Succar v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 8, 18-19 & n.14 (1st Cir. 2005) (discussing Succar's
likely ineligibility to return to the United States for ten years due to his illegal presence in the
country exceeding one year). At a minimum, since parolees are statutorily ineligible for voluntary
departure due to 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229(c)(a)(4) (West 2006), most parolees will find themselves barred
from return for five years due to an involuntary removal in the case of an adverse judgment, where
no waiver is granted due to 8 U.S.C.A. § 1 182(a)(9)(A)(i), (iii) (West 2006). Id. at 18-19.
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United States economy as well as its social policy, which is so centrally
based on family maintenance and stability.185 Regulations such as
§ 245.1 (c)(8) not only make legitimate immigration much more difficult
for a class of potentially deserving aliens, but also disrupt their family
structures and their ability to earn money, pay taxes, and support the
economy at large. There undoubtedly are those who would balk at such
concerns in the cases of aliens who arrive illegally, are immediately placed
into parole, and then are subject to a speedy removal proceeding. Such a
position would likely find great support in both the academic community
and the general populace. Unfortunately, the wheels of immigrant justice
do not turn with such mercurial efficiency.
B. The Long Waitfor Resolution
Perhaps the most significant systemic problem facing the immigration
adjudication system in the United States today is the incredible caseloads
which inundate the administrative agencies responsible for them. Between
fiscal years 2000 and 2004, immigration courts in the United States
received over 1,400,000 cases.' 86 At the end of fiscal year 2004, the BIA
alone had 33,544 cases pending.187
These heavy caseloads are certainly not unfamiliar to other areas of the
justice system. 8 What makes them so significant in the immigration
context, however, is that the ultimate resolution of a case could well mean
permanent removal from the country. For a person who has spent an
appreciable amount of time-in some cases years-building
a life in the
189
United States, this sentence may be even worse than death.
185. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) (extolling the virtues of the family to
American society).
186. See EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FY 2004
STATISTICALYEAR BOOKB2 (2005), http:llwww.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/fyO4syb.pdf. This number
was calculated by adding together the receipts of all immigration court matters from FY 2000
through FY 2004. See id. These statistics include proceedings such as deportation, exclusion,
removal, credible fear, reasonable fear, claimed status, asylum only, rescission, continued detention
review, NACARA, and withholding only, as well as bond determinations, and motions. Id. at B 1.
These cases fall annually to just over 200 immigration judges which are spread throughout the
country. See Executive Office for Immigration Review, Dep't of Justice, Office of the Chief
Immigration Judge website, http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/sibpages/lCadr.htm (last visited Feb. 12,
2006) (breaking down the immigration courts and judges by state and city).
187. ExECUTIvE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, supra note 186, at U2. The number of
judges on the BIA was also substantially reduced in 2002 from 21 to 11. Id. at Ul.
188. For a snapshot of increasing caseloads since 1995 in the federal district and appellate
courts, as well as the bankruptcy courts, see OFFICE OFJUDGES PROGRAMS, ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S.
COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS, 2004 JUDICIAL CASELOAD INDICATORS 6
(2004), http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2004/front/judbus03.pdf.
189. See Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (discussing the negative
consequences of deportation).
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Take for example a male alien aged thirty who comes to the United
States from Columbia."9 Assume that he has no legal basis for being in the
United States, but wishes to claim asylum.' 9' The reviewing officer at the
port of entry may determine that his claim of fear of persecution merits a
further hearing, but that the alien is not clearly admissible. 92 If the
reviewing officer determines that the alien is not a threat, he will likely
parole the alien into the country pending a removal proceeding and hearing
on his asylum claim. Assuming that the alien's claim of asylum takes four
years to resolve-from trial before the immigration judge to appeal before
the BIA 193-- he will be thirty-four years old before any resolution can be
reached on his case. During that time, assume that he has found stable
employment, paid taxes, attended church and community activities,
married a United States citizen, and had two children. Section 245.1 (c)(8)
would operate to deny this alien from adjustment based on his marriage (or
his employment), simply because he had been paroled and placed in
removal proceedings four years ago. If he is ultimately denied his claim of
asylum, he may be removed and potentially prohibited from returning to
the United States for ten years. 94 This may place his family in the difficult
position of being separated from one parent, and having to raise children
on a single-parent income. It may also place the alien in the perhaps
impossible situation of having to remake a life in a country where he may
no longer have any family or community ties, prospective employment,
and in which he potentially left in fear for his life in the first place. As
mentioned before, such a result may seem palatable in cases of speedy
removal of undeserving aliens; but when the process takes four years to
complete, the fundamental fairness of asking aliens to put their lives
completely on hold seems very questionable indeed.

190. Columbia is a good example because it is a major point of departure to the United States,
comprising roughly 3.6% of all cases filed in fiscal year 2004. EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR
IMMIGRATION REVIEW, supra note 186 at El.
191. Asylum is the mechanism whereby an alien can be granted permission to remain in the
United States if he can demonstrate a credible fear of returning to his country of origin based on
one of the following five statutorily protected grounds: race, religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group, or political opinion. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B) (2000).
192. Such a case would be a typical example of how an alien might end up on parole while
awaiting a hearing on his claim for asylum. This was the case in Succar. Succar v. Ashcroft, 394
F.3d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 2005).
193. This timeframe was arbitrarily selected, but is certainly not unreasonable. Consider that
in the three principle cases discussed in this Note the initial dates of entry for the immigrants were
1998, 1990 (approx.), and 1989 respectively. Each of these cases was still in adjudication in 2005.
Id.; Zheng v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 98, 103 (3d Cir. 2005); Mouelle v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 923, 924
(8th Cir. 2005).
194. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (sketching the statutory scheme that places
many arriving aliens who are removed in a position of being unable to return to the United States
legitimately for many years).
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VI. CONCLUSION

Any conclusion to such a discussion should necessarily begin with a
reiteration of Congress's stated intent in passing the INA in 1952. Its
passage was intended to vindicate the three central policies of
(1) reunifying families, (2) protecting the domestic labor force, and
(3) promoting the immigration of persons with useful skills.1 95 These goals
have guided not only the broader immigration framework in this country
at least since 1952, but also the continuation and refinement of the
adjustment of status mechanism. Adjustment of status features centrally
in the first and third goals of the INA framework. Streamlined facilitation
of adjustment of status allows for those aliens who have a statutory right
to become legal permanent residents to do so in a fashion that is the least
disruptive to them and their families, and is the most expeditious to the
United States labor force. Congress's clear intent in passing and
substantially maintaining 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255(a) was to include paroled
aliens in the class of adjustment eligible aliens to fulfill its stated public
policy goals.
Section 245. 1(c)(8) not only obstructs the fundamental public policy
goals of the INA, but it also plays havoc with traditional notions of due
process and fairness. Although it is conceded that arriving aliens do not
have the same due process rights as citizens or other immigrants,19 6 it also

is true that immigration proceedings often involve not just the alien in
question, but also his family. 197 If an immigrant's family members are
United States citizens or legal permanent residents, then the question of the
process which is due to such aliens becomes much trickier.'9 8 Section
245.1 (c)(8) results in a denial of process which would otherwise be due to
an alien who has specifically been enumerated by Congress as statutorily
eligible for adjustment of status.
Finally, even if arguments of public policy and constitutional mandate
are not considered persuasive, the regulation must fail on simple precepts
of administrative law and statutory construction. Although judicial review
in immigration is quite limited, 99 this does not mean that reviewing courts
cannot examine pure questions of law and statutory interpretation. 200 In a

195. See Curran, supra note 30, at 97 (citation omitted).
196. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (quoting United
States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950)).
197. See generally Moyce, supra note 95 (discussing what process should be due not only to
aliens, but also to their petitioning spouses in adjustment proceedings).
198. See id.
199. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (West 2006).
200. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289,298,314 n.38 (2001) (calling the question of whether
the Attorney General had the power to exclude an alien from eligibility for relief from deportation
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typical case, an agency is granted deference to its decision making if it is
within the clear mandate of the enabling statute or is otherwise
reasonable.2"' The courts that have reviewed § 245.1 (c)(8), however, have
shown on either Chevron step-one or step-two analyses that the regulation
is an impermissible usurpation of Congress's power to define eligibility
for adjustment of status.2 °2
Admittedly, the question will be considered close by many observers.
In such situations, however, the most prudent course of action should be
to follow the immigration rule of lenity and interpret the statute in the light
most favorable to the paroled alien. If Congress's authority to control
immigration is to appear legitimate to the citizens of the United States, its
immigrants and aliens, and indeed, to the world at large, it must not allow
the almost wholly unaccountable fourth branch of government 2 3 to usurp
all power to define eligibility for a crucial benefit such as adjustment of
status. To do so would be a betrayal, not only of the Constitutional tripartite system of government, but also of those famous words which
appear at the base of Lady Liberty2 -assuring for all the continuing role
of the United States as the fairest country in the world to the worthy
immigrant.

in the criminal context a pure question of law); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,446 (1987)
(calling the divining of congressional intent with respect to standards of judicial determination in
asylum cases to be "a pure question of statutory construction for the courts to decide").
201. See Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984).
202. Compare Succar v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 8, 35-36 (1st Cir. 2005) (utilizing step-one
analysis to invalidate), and Bona v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 663, 668-72 (9th Cir. 2005) (same), with
Zheng v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 98, 116-20 (3d Cir. 2005) (utilizing step-two analysis to invalidate).
203. This language has been used to describe agencies in court opinions and scholarly writings
for many years. See FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470,487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting); Peter
L. Strauss, The PlaceofAgencies in Government: Separationof Powers and the Fourth Branch,
84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 578, 582 (1984).
204. See Lazarus, supra note 29, at 41.
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